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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of joint auditor pair and joint auditor 
tenure on corporate behavior. Using a sample of 208 year-observations 
of public companies traded on the Kuwait stock exchange (KSE) over the 
period of 2008 to 2009, evidence indicates a positive association between the 
choice of Big 4-Big 4 (BB) auditor pair and the level of corporate behavior. 
This result is consistent across the three aspects of corporate behavior (i.e. 
trading history, communication and disclosure). However, the choice of 
other auditor pairs has no impact on the company’s behavior. In addition, 
corporate behavior is positively related to joint auditor tenure when joint 
auditor tenure is measured in a continuous form. Using binary indicators 
for joint auditor tenure, the results, in general, indicate that corporate 
behavior in terms of trading history and communication improves after the 
fifth year of auditor engagement. 
Keywords: Kuwait corporate behavior, auditor tenure, joint audit
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of auditor pair choice and 
joint auditor tenure on corporate behavior of companies listed on Kuwait 
stock exchange (KSE) during the years 2008-20091. Corporate behavior 
1 Joint audit is defined as two independent audit firms share audit effort, sign single audit report, and 
have joint liability when performing an audit service. It implies also mutual quality controls and cross 
reviews procedures. It should be noted that joint audit is different from dual or double audit, where 
the latter indicates that each audit firm examines different sets of financial statements and expresses 
different audit opinions (see, Ratzinger, Audousset, Kettunen & Lesage, 2012).
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refers to the attitude to adopt the best business practices to reduce governance 
risk and create less risky investment environment.2 Corporate behavior is 
important because of its effect on corporate market value (Durnev & Kim, 
2005; Black, Jang & Kim, 2006). Companies trading sporadically and 
in shallow volumes, lacking a structure of corporate communication and 
disclosing weak financial and accounting reports exhibit poor corporate 
governance. Such a behavior raises a major concern over the quality and 
credibility of information and constitutes a high risk investment environment.
The credibility and reliability of corporate behavior is enhanced 
when it is subject to a form of independent, third-party audit. An audit 
service ensures that the practiced corporate behavior produces information 
according to the accepted accounting standards, and give an opinion on 
whether these information is free from material misstatements. By becoming 
familiar with clients, auditors can get a sense for the appropriateness of the 
practices made by the client in producing its information and issuing its 
interim reports.
Auditors have an important role to play in promoting and reinforcing 
trust and confidence in corporate practices. Auditors can check on the 
quality and reliability of the information produced as a result of corporate 
practices, and give their opinion on whether the financial statements are 
stated in accordance with accepted accounting standards. Because higher 
quality audits enhance information quality and credibility, higher quality 
audits should provide better check on the information aspects of the 
corporate behavior.
In Kuwait, joint audit has been mandatory since 1994. This requirement 
comes to restore trust in financial reporting after a series of major financial 
scandals and national threat events that shook the entire country’s capital 
market and financial infrastructure such as Al-Manakh crisis in 1982, the 
massive losses of Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) in the Spanish corporate 
group (Grupo Torras) in 1992 due to fraud schemes, and the Iraqi invasion 
to Kuwait in 19903. Although the joint audit Act has been enacted for more 
than twenty years, it is yet to address the auditor rotation. In Kuwait, calls 
in the media for auditor rotation have been expressed following the Enron-
2 Testing whether the improvement in corporate behavior leads to a decrease in governance risk is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 Many local audit firms lost their audit files due to the Iraqi invasion.
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Anderson era scandal and the enforcement of the U.S Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(Alanba, 2014)4. These events and calls have triggered concerns about the 
quality of the external auditors. 
DeAngelo (1981) states that “the quality of audit services is defined 
to be the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both 
(a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the 
breach.” DeAngelo (1981) argues that the size of audit firm is a surrogate 
for audit quality. A large body of accounting literature shows that larger 
auditors (e.g. Big 4 international audit firms) provide higher audit quality 
than smaller auditors (e.g. non-Big 4 audit firms) (Memis & Cetenak, 
2012; Chen, Hsu, Huang & Yang, 2013; Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, Lobo 
& Mathieu, 2011; Clinch, Stokes & Zho, 2010; Lee, Mande & Son, 2009; 
Behn, Choi & Kang, 2008; Francis, 2004; Watkins, Hillison, & Morecroft 
2004; DeAngelo, 1981). Applying DeAngelo’s (1981) size-quality scheme 
to Kuwait, Big 4-Big 4 auditor pair should provide the highest level of audit 
quality, whilst non-Big 4- non-Big 4 auditor pair provides the lowest level 
of audit quality. Between these two limits, audits supplied by a Big 4-non-
Big 4 auditor pair should fall in.
The controversy still hinges on whether long auditor tenure impairs or 
maintains audit quality. Auditor tenure is the duration of the auditor-client 
business relationship. Academic studies show mixed results as to whether 
audit quality is lower in longer auditor tenure. Some studies show no 
impact of long auditor tenure on audit quality (e.g. Gul, Jaggi & Krishnan, 
2007; Johnson, Khuranna & Reynolds, 2002); others find that audit quality 
decreases with long tenure (e.g. Chu, Church & Zang, 2012; Dao, Mishra & 
Raghunandan, 2008; Davis, Soo & Trompeter, 2009; Raghunathan, Lewis 
& Evans, 1994); and others report that long tenure improves audit quality 
(e.g. Srinidhi, Leung & Gul, 2010; Myers, Myers & Omer, 2003).
In this paper, three corporate practices are addressed as suggested 
by the joint report of the National Investor (TNI) and the Institute for 
Corporate Governance (Hawkama): trading history (i.e. stock volatility, 
length of trading history, liquidity and structure of shareholding), corporate 
communication (i.e. to what extent a company communicates with its 
4 http://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/economy-news/437048/13-01-2014
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shareholders and the market) and disclosure transparency (i.e. access to 
corporate information and disclosure quality).5 
Corporate behavior is measured using a proxy (hereafter, BASIK) 
developed by TNI and Hawkamah.6 BASIK is “a corporate scoring 
methodology to assess nonfinancial risks often associated with regional 
stock market investments” (TNI Market Insight 2008: 4). It is a composition 
measure of three categories (trading history, communication, and disclosure), 
where each category consists of several parameters.
Several reasons motivate this paper. First, despite the long history of 
Kuwait stock exchange (KSE), Kuwait still falls behind other GCC (Gulf 
council countries) in improving corporate practices (Task force report, 
2007), which inversely affects the investment environment. In Kuwait, 
the regulatory structure is still underdeveloped, and the KSE’s inspection, 
investigation and surveillance powers are yet to be strong and apparently 
lack of defined processes. In the absence of developed and strong regulatory 
structures, the choice of joint auditor pair may be seen as one possible 
means of promoting companies’ best practices. In addition, because auditor 
litigation is relatively absent and lawsuits against auditors are confidentially 
undisclosed in Kuwait, it is difficult to say that audit firms are motivated to 
provide differential audit quality.
Third, the joint audit regulatory requirement is a feature of the Kuwait 
market that is not commonly observed in all industry sectors of other GCC 
markets, in specific, or in most other countries, in general. To the author’s 
best knowledge, a few studies carried out in Kuwait on auditor pair effect 
(Al-Shammari, 2013; Alanezi & Alfaraih, 2012; Al-Shammari, Yaqout & 
Hussaini, 2008; Alanezi, Alfaraih, Alrashaid & Albolushi, 2003). However, 
more studies are still needed to explore further on the issue of joint auditor 
5 TNI is a private investment management and advisory firm located in Abu Dhabi. It has three 
principal business lines: asset management, investment banking and private equity. Howkamah is a 
private corporate governance institute deals with corporate governance reforms. It was founded by 
international organizations (e.g., OECD, IFC, and the World Bank) and regional organizations (e.g., 
the Union of Arab Banks and the Dubai International Financial Center).
6 BASIK stands for Behavioral Assessment Score for Investors and Corporation.
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choice, given the importance of this issue regionally and globally7. The 
current study uses larger sample and different measure of corporate behavior. 
It also explores the impact of auditor tenure on the level of corporates’ best 
practices.
Furthermore, many local audit firms in Kuwait seek a joint venture 
with big international audit firms such as the big four to increase audit 
quality (Al-Mudhaf, 1990) and market share. However, investors view most 
concurrent associations as fictitious and purely established for marketing 
and promoting activities (Aljoman, 2008).8 Many question whether these 
associations can improve corporate behavior and thus of meaningful value 
to investors. Lastly, there is a tendency among the auditors to believe 
that public firms in Kuwait require audit service to fulfil the formality 
requirement only (Alhusaini, 2000). For example, in response to an inquiry 
whether clients are interested in computerized audit services, a manager in 
Coopers & Lybrand in Kuwait indicates that most public clients show no 
concerns over audit quality. Rather, clients require audit service to comply 
with local reporting regulations (Al-Hajji, 1993).
The author reports a positive association between the choice of BB 
auditor pair and the level of corporate behavior. Clients hiring two Big 4 
auditors experience an increase in the corporate behavioral level. This result 
seems consistent across the three dimensions of corporate behavior. That 
is, the clients of Big 4-Big 4 pair exhibit better patterns of trading history, 
greater communication, and higher disclosure transparency. However, the 
choice of BS/SS auditor pairs has no impact on the company’s behavior. 
The rationale for these results is that interactions between Big 4 auditors 
are rather highly coordinated, more technological efficient and increase 
incentives to produce an adequate effort for Big 4 pairs. This explanation, 
however, seems unlikely with other auditor pairs.
Evidence also shows that auditor tenure, measured in a continuous 
form, is positively related to the level of corporate behavior. Measuring 
auditor tenure in a dichotomous form, longer tenure is positively associated 
7 Following the global financial crisis, questions and concerns have been raised about the quality of 
audit firms. The European Commission (EC) issued the Green Paper “Audit Policy: Lessons from the 
Crisis” (EC, 2010), which suggested several institutional mechanisms, among them the joint audit.
8  http://www.alraimedia.com/articles.aspx?id=57460
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with the level of corporate behavior, and this association is evident in the 
company’s trading history and communication. That is, joint auditor tenure 
has a positive effect on a company’s communication and disclosure after the 
fifth year of the two auditors’ engagement. Short client-auditor relationship 
(i.e. two to three years), however, has no effect on the corporate behavior 
level. Thus, longer joint auditor-client relation, in general, leads to a greater 
improvement in the client’s behavior.
In addition, results indicate that auditor tenure of the choice of two Big 
4 auditors has no effect on the level of corporate behavior. This evidence is 
consistent when auditor tenure is measured in continuous and dichotomous 
forms. On the other hand, the auditor tenure of the choice of other auditor 
pairs (i.e. BS/SS) tends to have a negative effect on the DISCLOSURE 
parameter only. Again, this result is consistent using continuous and 
dichotomous forms of auditor tenure. 
This paper extends the literature on the quality of external audits in a 
joint setting, a subject that tends to be one of the most debated in the GCC 
and Europe after the global financial crisis. It also explores the impact of joint 
auditor choice and tenure on corporate practices of companies operating in 
a secretive environment (Kamla & Roberts, 2010), where publicly available 
information is often limited and is not always easily accessible.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section addresses the 
background and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design, data sources and sample selection. Empirical results and analysis 
are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Auditing in Kuwait
Article 161 of year 1994 requires all Kuwaiti public firms to have two 
audit firms acting as a joint auditor9. The regulation, however, does not apply 
to non-Kuwaiti firms listed on the KSE or to IPOs. Unlike France, Kuwait 
9 On January 8th, 1994, Law No. 51 of year 1994 added a paragraph to article No. 161 of Commercial 
Companies Law No. 15 of the year 1960, which requires KSE-listed companies to have two external 
auditors from two separate audit firms. 
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has no legislation that regulates the allocation of working hours between 
both auditors. The law also does not require public traded companies to have 
two Big 4 auditors and specifies no time limit for auditor rotation. Auditors 
are selected by shareholders during the annual meeting of shareholders. 
Audit and non-audit fees are set by the board of directors and not disclosed 
in the company’s annual report. 
To practice auditing, external auditors must be licensed by the 
Ministry of Commerce. All public companies must submit audited financial 
statements within a period of three months of the company’s year end to the 
ministry of commerce, KSE and the general meetings of stakeholders. In 
addition to the annual audited financial statements, public traded companies 
must submit reviewed interim financial statements on quarterly basis to 
the above-named authorities. The financial statements of KSE-listed firms 
are prepared according to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), and audited in conformity with the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA). Besides the IFRS and ISA, independent external auditors 
are jointly required to form an opinion on the company’s compliance by 
applying the Companies Law in Kuwait, the Ministerial Resolutions and 
Instructions and the Resolutions and Instruction issued by the Central Bank 
of Kuwait and the Capital Markets Authority. The independent auditor’s 
report must have the signature of the two auditors, which makes them jointly 
liable for the given opinion. 
Structure of Joint Audit
In their theoretical paper, Deng, Lu, Simunic and Yee (2014) compare 
the audit quality between joint audit and single audit. They argue that the 
total evidence precision achieved by two big audit firms (BB) in a joint audit 
setting is the same as that achieved by one big audit firm (B) in a single 
audit setting due to the advantage of similar technological efficiency. Also, 
each big audit firm bears one half of the misstatement costs. In a joint audit 
setting therefore, each big auditor exerts an equal share of the effort that 
would have been exerted by one big auditor in a single audit setting.
On the other hand, the total evidence precision achieved jointly by one 
big auditor and small auditor (BS) is less than the total evidence precision 
achieved solely by one big auditor (B). This is because big auditors have 
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the advantage in auditing technology which makes their marginal costs 
of evidence precision lower than those of small auditors. In addition, the 
choice of BS pair may lead to a potential “free-rider dilemma”, where small 
auditors depend on the efforts of big auditors. Small audit firms lack the 
required and sufficient resources to conduct a proper audit for complex and 
internationalized clients, leaving a significant audit portion to big audit firms 
(Ratzinger, Audousset, Kettunen & Lesage, 2012). Also, in a joint audit 
setting, big auditors bear lager proportion of litigation risk and reputation 
loss costs than small auditors (Deng, Lu, Simunic & Yee, 2014). 
However, it is not enough to have no differences in technological 
efficiency between the two big auditors. Cooperation should shape the 
relationship between the two big auditors in a joint audit setting. In a 
cooperative structure, the goal is shared equally between the two auditors. 
A cooperative team structure can establish and enhance the means of 
communication, thereby increasing the team productivity (Tjosvold & 
Jonhson, 2000), especially in tasks where coordination is required (Stanne 
& Johnson, 1999). Cooperation between the two big auditors should fasten 
issue resolution, shorten examination procedures, find more streamlined 
facts, and follow more effective compliance. In a cooperative scheme, 
further areas of collaboration can be identified and improved and various 
audit methodologies and analyses can be recognized and learned. Moreover, 
efficient and effective results can be accomplished if a proper planning is 
set and well-defined processes are followed.
Conversely, a joint venture between direct competitors is likely to 
be unsuccessful (Park & Russo, 1996). In a competitive structure setting, 
the two big auditors strive against each other for a goal that each auditor 
hopes to achieve solely. Less communication and insufficient information 
exchange may result due to the difficulty of the two competitive auditors to 
closely work with each other during the audit conduct (Zerni, Haapamäki, 
Järvinen & Niemi, 2012). Therefore, weak coordination, task conflicts, and 
poor performance are more likely to occur between the two big auditors. 
Based on a sample of 89 Big 4 audit and consulting teams, Gardner (2010) 
shows that collective performance is poor when several team members 
perceive themselves as leaders.
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The Effect of Auditor Pair Choice on Corporate Behavior
As noted earlier, corporate behavior is important because of its effect 
on the firm value. This effect is more obvious in countries with insufficient 
regulations and cultural constraints to monitor corporate actions (Black, 
2001). Evidence in Black (2001) shows a positive link between corporate 
behavior and corporate value for a small sample of Russian companies. 
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) report that the market value of the Korean public 
firms are increasing with greater corporate behavior. Dowell, Hart and Yeung 
(2000) claim that the capital market places a lesser value on companies with 
no or little strict employment to global governance standards. In Klapper 
and Love (2002), investment risk is higher in inefficient corporate structures 
and weak legal infrastructure.
In Kuwait where no specific and clear regulations addressing on 
corporate behavior, investors may place heavy weight on variations in the 
corporate behavior of public companies to make their investment decisions. 
Therefore, it is in the best interest of these companies to improve their 
corporate behavior. Audits are one way to improve and enhance the behavior 
of companies. If Big 4 auditors are perceived to produce high quality audits, 
it seems reasonable to argue that two Big 4 auditors provide higher quality 
audits than a Big 4 auditor paired with another non-Big 4 auditor, and/or 
than two non-Big 4 auditors. Francis, Richard, and Vanstraelen (2009) show 
that companies hiring two Big 4 auditors exhibit smaller income-increasing 
abnormal accruals than those hiring one Big 4 auditor, paired with non-Big 
4 auditor, and then those hiring non-Big 4 pairs. Zerni, Haapamäki, Järvinen 
and Niemi (2012) also examine the effects of joint audit on audit quality 
for a sample of Swedish public and private companies listed between 2000 
and 2006. They find that companies with two Big 4 auditors enjoy lower 
abnormal accruals, higher level of earnings conservatism, better credit 
ratings, and lower chance of insolvency risk within the next year. Alanezi 
and Alfaraih (2012) use a sample of 163 firms listed on the KSE in 2006 
to test whether the level of compliance with the IFRS-required disclosures 
among these companies vary with the choice of auditor pair. They show 
that companies audited by two Big 4 auditors comply more with the IFRS-
required disclosures than those audited by a Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditor 
pair, and obviously than two non-Big 4 auditors.
104
malaysian accounting review, volume 15 no. 1, 2016
Therefore, if larger auditors produce greater quality audits, as indicated 
by prior literature, and if cooperation shapes the structure of the joint audit 
team, where better coordination and greater communication are expected, the 
role of a BB auditor pair should lend more confidence and higher credibility 
to a company’s behavior. 10
On the other hand, if the joint audit group is structured competitively, 
where weaker coordination and poorer performance are likely to occur 
between the two distinct auditors, then the role of a BB auditor pair may 
inversely or have no impact on corporate behavior. This result would be 
consistent with Lobo, Paugam, Zang and Casta (2014), who find companies 
audited by a BB pair to be less likely to report an impairment, and report 
a smaller impairment when signs of low performance indicate greater 
impairment likelihood. They also show that a BB pair are more likely to 
reduce impairment disclosures when they report impairment. In addition, 
Marmousez (2009) reports that conditional conservatism, measured by 
Basu’s asymmetric timeliness proxy, is absent for BB pair’s clients. 
Given the above-competing theories and discussion on opposing views 
and evidence on the role of BB auditor pair, the first hypothesis is presented 
in null form with no direction:
H1: Companies	audited	by	a	BB	auditor	pair	do	not	differ	in	corporate	
behavior	than	companies	audited	by	a	BS (or SS)	auditor	pair.
The Effect of Joint Auditor Tenure on Corporate Behavior
The association between auditor tenure and audit quality is controversial 
and still unresolved. Proponents of mandatory rotation of auditors claim 
that longer client-audit firm relation lead to impaired independence, reduced 
objectivity and increased complacency. On the other hand, the opponents 
argue that auditor tenure should lead to higher quality audit as auditors 
become familiar with the client’s business activities, internal control and 
reporting matters. 
10 Cooperation may also shape the work of BS auditor pair as well as SS auditor pair. However, two 
issues may rise. First, the level of quality audit produced by each pair is more likely to be lower 
than that produced by the BB auditor pair. Second, the free-rider problem is likely in a BS auditor 
pair setting, where the non-Big 4 auditor lacks the experience, expertise, and required resources.
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Many studies show a positive relation between the auditor tenure and 
audit quality. For instance, Carcello and Nagy (2004) conclude that the 
incidence of fraudulent reporting is lower in tenure, and Ghosh and Menon 
(2005) show that ERCs are higher in tenure. Myers, Myers and Omer (2003) 
report that longer client-auditor relation reduces absolute discretionary and 
current accruals. In Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004), auditor tenure has 
a negative impact on cost of debt. Libby and Frederick (1990) show that 
experienced auditors have better understanding of accounting errors and 
lower rates of error frequency. 
However, Myers, Myers, Palmrose and Scholz (2005) show that 
income-increasing misstatements is more likely to occur in a longer client-
auditor relation. In Chi and Huang (2005), audit quality declines as auditor 
tenure exceeds 5 years. Carey and Simnett (2006) show that longer client-
auditor relationship leads to lower tendency to issue a going-concern opinion 
and just beating (missing) earnings targets. Moreover, evidence of Dao, 
Mishra and Raghunandan (2008) suggests that shareholders view longer 
auditor tenure as an impairment to audit quality. Others show that the bid-
ask spread (a proxy of information asymmetry) has a U-shaped association 
with auditor tenure (e.g. Almutairi, Dunn & Skantz, 2009). 
Like in a single audit setting, the effect of auditor tenure on audit 
quality in a joint audit scheme suggests mixed views. In a joint audit setting, 
the disruption caused by auditor rotation is minimized since it allows for 
individual auditor rotation while retaining firm-specific knowledge (Ittonen 
& Tronnes, 2015). In addition, the individual auditor rotation is more likely 
to minimize collusion among the three parties (i.e. auditor one, auditor two, 
and managers). Also, the impact of long tenure on auditor independence 
and objectivity is likely to be lower since audit and consulting fees will be 
proportionally distributed between two different auditors. Moreover, both 
auditors jointly can resist any pressure from managers and large shareholders 
to form a favorable audit opinion (Zerni, Haapamäki, Järvinen & Niemi, 
2012). Lastly, because it is too costly to bribe two different auditors (e.g. 
Big 4/Big 4 or Big 4/non-Big 4), long client-auditor relationship is less 
likely to lower the likelihood of auditors’ truthful reporting. 
On the other hand, long auditor tenure in a joint audit may inversely 
affect the audit quality. Deng, Lu, Simunic and Yee (2012) claim that joint 
106
malaysian accounting review, volume 15 no. 1, 2016
audit compromises auditor independence, leading to higher level of earnings 
management. They explain that a client company has an opportunity of 
internal opinion shopping from its two auditors. 
Thus, if auditor tenure maintains audit quality, it should have a 
positive influence on the corporate behavior level. Corporate behavior 
may improve and get better over time as both auditors watch closely the 
corporate practices and verify the credibility of information produced by 
these practices. Conversely, if joint auditor tenure impairs audit quality, then 
auditor tenure should have a negative or no effect of the level of corporate 
behavior. Over years, both auditors get familiarized with their client’s 
practices and gradually see these practices as a routine. Consequently, the 
auditors’ objectivity and professional skepticism of information resulted 
from these practices are more likely to be minimized. Based on the above 
opposite views and mixed-evidence shaping the association between auditor 
tenure and audit quality, the second hypothesis is stated in null form with 
no direction:
H2:	 There	is	no	relationship	between	corporate	behavior	and	joint	
audit	firm	tenure.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Variables and Models
To measure the corporate behavior, this paper uses a corporate scoring 
measure, known as BASIK, developed by the National Investor (TNI) and the 
Institute for Corporate Governance (Hawkamah). It measures 43 parameters 
across three dimensions: trading history, communication, and disclosure, 
and it assesses liquidity, volatility and transparency of public companies11. 
11  While BASIK components are equally weighted, each (trading history, corporate communication and disclosure) 
has a different number of parameters. Trading history consists of nine parameters (stock volatility, market volatility, 
trading history, trading frequency, average daily turnover, bid/ask spread, number of shareholders, possibility of 
foreign ownership and proportion of foreign ownership). Corporate communication also contains nine parameters: 
history of publicly available accounts, availability of a corporate website, availability of the recent annual report 
on the corporate website, availability of investor relations contact details, pre-announcements of the results 
publication dates, holding of analyst meetings and conference calls, AGM pre-announcement dates, AGM’s notice 
period in days, and EPS computation. As for the disclosure dimension, it contains twenty-five parameters. These 
parameters are number of shareholders, whether or not foreign ownership allowed, percentage of foreign ownership 
allowed, annual reports in English, disclosure typed, disclosures in non-alterable format, complete interim results 
disclosures, and eighteen annual report items (e.g., management and chairmen report, summary of operations, 
board sub-committees, governance policies…etc.), 
107
Joint Auditor PAir, Joint Auditor tenure And CorPorAte BehAvior 
BASIK is a number between zero and ten, where a higher score indicates 
a better corporate behavior. In other words, companies with higher BASIK 
number are higher in liquidity, greater in transparency and lower in volatility.
BB, BS and JTENURE indicate the independent variables, which are 
the main interest of this paper. BB represents an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the clients’ two auditors are Big 4, and zero otherwise. BS 
is also an indicator variable equals to one if a client is audited by one Big 
4 audit firm and one non-Big 4 audit firm, and zero otherwise. JTENURE 
is the average consecutive number of years of the joint auditor pair-client 
relationship. 
This paper also controls some variables that may have an impact 
on corporate behavior. To capture the effect of the first year engagement 
of both auditors, the author includes JCHANGE, which is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the tenure of auditor one and auditor two is 
equal to one, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, and is included because larger companies are more likely to 
have better corporate behavior than smaller companies.12 LEVERAGE is the 
total assets scaled by the total liabilities. Because they are watched closely 
by the creditors, highly levered companies are more likely to show better 
behavior. ROA is the company’s annual net income deflated by total assets, 
a measure of performance. Better performing companies are more likely to 
exert better behavior. AGE, company age, is the number of operating years 
since the foundation year of the company. Companies are expected to have 
greater corporate behavior, as they get older. This variable is included to 
control the positive link between audit firm tenure and firm age (Myers, 
Myers & Omer, 2003; Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Ghosh & Moon, 2005). 
To capture the effect of variation in years and industry sectors, YEAR and 
INDUSTRY are included in the regression models. YEAR is a binary value 
that is equal to one if the year is 2008, and zero otherwise. INDUSTRY is 
five binary numbers that represent the six KSE industry sectors (see Table 
1 for variables definition).
12 Measuring SIZE as the natural logarithm of market capitalization does not change the reported results.
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Table 1: Variables Definition
Dependent Variables:
BASIK = A number between zero and ten, where a higher score 
represents better corporate governance behavior.
TRADING 
HISTORY
= An evaluation measure of volatility, length of trading history, 
liquidity and shareholding structure on a scale between zero 
and ten.
COMM = Corporate communication measures the extent to which 
a company communicates with its shareholders and the 
broader market on a scale between zero and ten.
DISCLOSURE = Corporate disclosure evaluates access to, and quality of, 
public corporate information on a scale between zero and 
ten. 
Independent Variables:
BB = An indicator variable that is equal to one if both of the 
company’s auditors are Big4, and equal to zero otherwise. 
BS = An indicator variable that is equal to one if one of the 
company’s auditors is a Big4, and equal to zero otherwise.
JTENURE = The average consecutive number of years of joint auditors-
client relationship. 
SHORT = A binary variable that is equal to one if the tenure of the joint 
auditor pair is ≥ 2 years and ≤ 3 years, and zero otherwise.
MEDIUM = A binary variable that is equal to one if the tenure of the 
joint audit auditor pair is ≥ 4 years and ≤ 5 years, and zero 
otherwise. 
LONG = A binary variable that is equal to one if the tenure of the joint 
auditor pair is ≥ 6 years, and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables:
JCHANGE = A binary equal to one if the tenure of auditor one and auditor 
two is equal to one, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEVERAGE = The total liabilities scaled by the total assets.
ROA = Annual net income deflated by the total assets.
AGE = The number of years since the foundation year of the 
company.
YEAR = A binary variable that is equal to one if the year is 2008, and 
zero otherwise. 
INDUSTRY = Four binary variables that represent the five market 
industries.
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Therefore, to test the impact of the choice of the joint auditor pair and 
the tenure of joint auditor pair on corporate behavior, the following Tobit 
regression model is presented:13
BASIK = µ0 + µ1BB + µ2BS + µ3JTENURE + µ4JCHNAGE + µ5SIZE +
 µ6LEVERAGE + µ7ROA + µ8AGE + µ9YEAR + µ10-14INDUSTRY 
+ e (1) 
As mentioned in footnote 8, because BASIK is based on three equally 
weighted categories (trading history, communication, and disclosure), each 
category consists of a different number of parameters. This means that these 
categories are unequally weighted. Therefore, the author examines whether 
the choice of joint auditor pair and joint auditor tenure vary across each 
BASIK’s category.
TRADING HISTORY = θ0 + θ1BB + θ2BS + θ3JTENURE + θ4JCHNAGE 
+ θ5SIZE + θ6LEVERAGE + θ7ROA + θ8AGE + θ10YEAR + θ 
10-14INDUSTRY + ē. 
 (2)
 
COMM. = α0 + α1BB + α2BS + α3JTENURE + α4JCHNAGE + α5SIZE +           
α6LEVERAGE + α7ROA + α8AGE + α9YEAR + α10-14INDUSTRY + 
(3) 
DISCLOSURE = β0 + β1BB + β2BS + β3JTENURE + β4JCHNAGE + β5SIZE + 
β6LEVERAGE + β7ROA + β8AGE + β9YEAR + β10-14INDUSTRY + ę. 
(4)
Similar to BASIK, the dependent variables: TRADING HISTORY, 
COMM and DISCLOSURE are all a scale from zero to ten.14
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
13 The author uses Tobit regression models because the dependent variables in all equations are 
between 0 and 10.
14 Following prior literature (e.g., Almutairi, Dunn and Skantz, 2009; Carcello and Nagy, 2004), 
the author uses binary variables to proxy for auditor tenure. The second and third year of the joint 
auditor-client relation is classified as SHORT (i.e., 2 ≤ tenure ≤ 3), and tenure more than five years 
as LONG (i.e., tenure ≥ 6). Medium tenure (i.e., 4 ≤ tenure ≤ 5) is set as a benchmark group in all 
regression models employing binary variables for tenure.
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Data on audit firms are obtained from the KSE’s department of public 
companies. The department of public companies started collecting the 
data on auditors since 2000. Table 2 panel-A shows that most KSE-listed 
companies employ one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 (i.e. BS). Panel-B of the 
same table indicates that 20.5 percent of the companies listed during the 
period 2000-2010 hire two Big 4 audit firms. During the sample period, 
approximately 83 percent of the public companies employ one Big 4 and 
one non-Big 4 audit firms, and about 17 percent of listed companies employ 
two non-Big 4 auditors. This suggests that the vast majority of KSE-listed 
companies tend to have higher audit quality provided by at least one of the 
Big 4 auditors. Panel-B also indicates that tenures of auditor one and auditor 
two are about 3.7 years and 3.4 years, respectively. On average, 26 (29) 
percent of the listed companies hire new first (second) auditor. Companies 
tend to replace their second auditor more than their first auditor by 3 percent. 
About 23 percent of the public companies maintain their first auditor for 
more than five years, while 20 percent of listed companies keep their second 
auditor for the same number of years of audit engagement.
Table 2: Data Sources 
Panel-A: Frequency of Joint Auditor Pairs by Year
YEAR BB BS SS TOTAL
2000 21 30 7 58
2001 23 49 8 80
2002 24 55 9 88
2003 23 50 7 80
2004 28 71 17 116
2005 31 91 24 146
2006 28 104 24 156
2007 27 108 26 161
2008 28 106 35 169
2009 29 105 38 169
2010 26 103 38 167
111
Joint Auditor PAir, Joint Auditor tenure And CorPorAte BehAvior 
Panel-B: Descriptive Statistics For Joint Auditor Pair For The Period 2000-
2010
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Tenure of auditor one 1390 3.681 2.629 1 11
Change of auditor one 1390 0.260 0.439 0 1
Short tenure of auditor one 1390 0.315 0.465 0 1
Medium tenure of auditor one 1390 0.192 0.394 0 1
Long tenure of auditor one 1390 0.232 0.422 0 1
Tenure of auditor two 1390 3.445 2.529 1 11
Change of auditor two 1390 0.290 0.454 0 1
Short tenure of auditor two 1390 0.321 0.467 0 1
Medium tenure of auditor two 1390 0.191 0.393 0 1
Long tenure of auditor two 1390 0.199 0.399 0 1
Big4 & Big4 auditors 1390 0.205 0.404 0 1
Big4 & non-Big4 auditors 1390 0.832 0.374 0 1
Non-Big4 & non-Big4 auditors 1390 0.168 0.374 0 1
Two data files are obtained through TNI public website, which 
contain score numbers on BASIK and its three parameters for all GCC 
publicly traded companies for the period of 2008 to 2009. Financial data is 
retrieved from Reuters database. The study sample is restricted to Kuwaiti 
public traded companies in the KSE for three reasons. First, all Kuwaiti 
KSE-listed companies are required to be audited by two auditors. This 
requirement, however, is imposed partially on certain industries in the other 
GCC exchange markets (e.g. banking sector in Saudi Arabia). Second, 
not all GCC public traded companies follow the international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS), which makes comparison difficult for results 
interpretation. Lastly, financial data and audit firm information are not 
available for the other GCC public companies. 
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Table 3: Sample Selection
Number of firms in the BASIK file 186
Number of firms after deleting those with missing financial data 183
Number of firms after deleting those with missing auditor data 175
Number of firms after deleting IPOs, redundant, banks, insurance and 
non-Kuwaiti firms
120
Number of firms after deleting those with outliers 110
Table 3 shows the sample selection procedure. After excluding other 
GCC firms from the BASIK files, the author ended up with 186 companies 
listed on the KSE market. Three companies with missing financial data 
and 8 companies with missing audit firms’ information are excluded. Also, 
55 companies are dropped from the sample because they either first-year 
IPOs, banks or non-Kuwaiti firms. To minimize the effect of the outliers, 
the top and bottom of one percent of continuous variables are winsorized. 
In total, there are 208 firm-year observations from 110 unique companies 
for the period of 2008 to 2009.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
regression models. The mean of BASIK is 2.73, indicating that KSE-listed 
companies, on average, have poor corporate behavior. The mean numbers 
of TRADING HISTROY, COMM and DISCLOSURE is 5.53, 2.21 and 2.13, 
respectively. While these public companies exhibit relatively higher level 
of trading history, they have weak communication with their shareholders 
and the market, and poor quality disclosure. This could explain that the 
poor behavior of KSE public companies, as indicated by BASIK, could 
be due to the weaker corporate communication and poorer disclosure 
transparency of KSE-listed companies. About 12 percent of the company-
year observations are associated with a BB pair, and about 80 percent (20 
percent) are associated with a BS pair (SS pair).15 Jointly and individually, 
the auditors have about five years of audit engagement with the client. More 
15 The accounting literature shows audit fees of the Big 4 auditors are higher than those of non-Big 4 
auditors. Therefore, hiring two Big 4 auditors is likely to be costlier.
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specifically, on average, 18 percent of the company-year observations have 
a joint auditor-client relationship of two to three years (SHORT), 15 percent 
have a joint-auditor-client relationship of four to five years (MEDIUM), 
and 27 percent have a joint auditor-client relationship of six years or longer 
(LONG). Approximately, 13 (16) percent of company-year observations 
represent joint (single) auditors in their first year with a client. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Period 2008-2009
Variable N Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
BASIK 208 2.727 2.040 1.320 5.030 1.144
TRADING HISTORY 208 5.533 5.480 3.910 7.740 0.797
COMM. 208 2.207 1.330 0.000 5.560 1.639
DISCLOSURE 208 2.138 1.280 0.900 4.620 1.291
Big4 & Big4 auditors 208 0.120 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.326
Big4 & non-Big4 auditors 208 0.803 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.399
Non-Big4 & non-Big4 auditors 208 0.197 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.399
Average tenure of joint auditor pair 208 4.788 4.500 1.000 10.000 2.657
Tenure of auditor one 208 4.875 4.000 1.000 10.000 2.897
Tenure of auditor two 208 4.702 4.000 1.000 10.000 2.790
Short tenure of joint auditor pair 208 0.178 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.383
Short tenure of auditor one 208 0.264 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.442
Short tenure of auditor two 208 0.226 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.419
Medium tenure of joint auditor pair 208 0.149 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.357
Medium tenure of auditor one 208 0.207 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.406
Medium tenure of auditor two 208 0.279 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.450
Long tenure of joint auditor pair 208 0.274 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.447
Long tenure of auditor one 208 0.389 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.489
Long tenure of auditor two 208 0.341 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.475
Change of joint auditor pair 208 0.130 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.337
Change of single auditor 208 0.163 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.371
Total assets (KWD Millions) 208 175.318 89.742 5.198 1784.173 262.637
Firm leverage 208 0.477 0.481 0.012 0.939 0.230
Return on Assets 208 -0.009 0.011 -0.307 0.195 0.089
Firm age 208 22.798 25.000 4.000 49.000 12.125
Year 208 2008.5 2009 2008 2009 0.50
Sector 208 4.36 5.00 2.00 7.00 1.62
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The mean (median) total assets of the companies in the sample is about 
KWD 175 (90) million, with the 25th (75th) percentile equal to 36.2 million 
(219 KWD million). Thus, the sample includes a wide range of company 
sizes. On average, company leverage (LEVERAGE) and performance (ROA) 
of the company-year observations are about 48 percent and -1 percent. Last, 
approximately, the age of the companies in the sample ranges between 4 
and 49 years with an average business life of 23 years.
Table 5 shows a t-test analysis between the clients of BB and those of 
BS/SS. Results indicate that clients of BB have better corporate behavior than 
clients of BS and SS, as indicated by BASIK. The results are consistent across 
all the three categories of BASIK. The BB auditor pair-client relationship is 
about the same as of the BS (SS) pair-client relationship. The clients of the 
BB auditor pair seem to be larger and older than clients of other joint auditor 
pairs. Lastly, the companies audited by the BB pair slightly outperform those 
audited by either BS or SS auditors.
Table 5: Comparison between Clients of BB and BS/SS
VARIABLE
BB BB/SS
Difference 
in Mean t-V p-VN Mean N Mean
BASIK 25 3.812 183 2.579 -1.233 -5.730 <.0001
TRADING HISTORY 25 6.129 183 5.452 -0.677 -3.940 0.001
COMM. 25 3.634 183 2.012 -1.621 -5.510 <.0001
DISCLOSURE 25 3.267 183 1.984 -1.283 -5.270 <.0001
JTENURE 25 4.180 183 4.872 0.692 1.110 0.275
SHORT 25 0.200 183 0.175 -0.025 -0.290 0.773
MEDIUM 25 0.080 183 0.159 0.079 1.270 0.211
LONG 25 0.360 183 0.262 -0.098 -0.950 0.352
JCHANGE 25 0.240 183 0.115 -0.125 -1.390 0.177
SIZE 25 19.46 183 18.097 -1.365 -7.650 <.0001
LEVERAGE 25 0.509 183 0.472 -0.037 -0.830 0.411
ROA 25 0.019 183 -0.013 -0.032 -1.870 0.071
AGE 25 31.00 183 21.678 -9.322 -3.540 0.001
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The results of Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in Table 
6. BASIK has a strong association with its first parameter (TRADING 
HISTROY, corr. = 0.47), but stronger association with the second parameter 
(COMM, corr. = 0.94) and the third parameter (DISCLOSURE, corr. = 0.98). 
Moreover, evidence indicates that BASIK is positively related to the choice 
of joint auditor pair, and this relationship is more pronounced for clients of 
the BB pair. In addition, the three categories of BASIK are more significantly 
related to the choice of BB pair than to the choice of BS pair. This preliminary 
evidence suggests that there is a positive association between corporate 
behavior and the choice of joint auditor, and this association is more 
pronounced for clients of BB auditor pair.
Table 6 also shows that in the first year of joint auditor engagement 
(JCHANGE), joint audit tenure is not related to BASIK. It is, however, 
positively correlated with the trading history parameter (TRADING 
HISTORY). In addition, the same table indicates a strong positive 
relationship between joint auditor tenure, measured in a continuous form, 
(JTENURE) and BASIK. Across the BASIK categories, however, JTENURE 
has a positive impact on COMM and DISCLOSURE only. Measuring joint 
tenure in a dichotomous form, a short time period of audit engagement 
(SHORT) is not associated either with BASIK or with the three practices of 
the corporate behavior. However, the correlation between joint auditor tenure 
and corporate behavior shows a significant decline in the fourth and fifth 
years (i.e., MEDIUM) of an engagement and a subsequent reversal of that 
decline in the sixth year and above (LONG). This trend also seems consistent 
across the three components of BASIK. These preliminary results may 
suggest that the market perceive a lower probability of corporate behavior 
in early years of joint auditor engagement and this perception changes 
later in the joint auditors’ tenure. Early in the auditors’ tenure, auditors are 
unfamiliar with the companies’ business operations and lack of knowledge 
of their clients’ industry, which may cause delay in information delivery to 
the market (Habib & Bhuiyan, 2011) and lead to information inefficiency 
(Lee, Mande & Son, 2009). In later years of joint auditor-client relationship, 
however, auditors become more effectively as they become more familiar 
with their clients’ operations and industry (Lee, Mande & Son, 2009).
Moreover, SIZE and LEVERAGE are statistically and positively 
correlated with BASIK, TRADING HISTORY, COMM and DISCLOSURE. 
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Larger companies and higher leveraged companies tend to behave better in 
terms of corporate behavior than their encounters. The ROA is negatively 
related to BASIK and TRADING HISTORY. Companies with lower 
performance exhibit lower level of corporate behavior, especially in terms of 
trading history. Lastly, YEAR is negatively correlated with BASIK, COMM, 
and DISCLOSURE. Clearly, the global financial crisis in 2008, on average, 
has a negative impact on the corporate behavior. 
Regression Results
Table 7 exhibits the results of Tobit regression models 1 through 4. 
Column (a) of Table 7 shows the results of the BASIK regression model 
(e.g. equation 1). Results indicate that BB has a significant and positive 
association with BASIK (p-value <0.000). On the other hand, BS is not 
related to BASIK. Thus, clients of BB tend to exert higher level of corporate 
behavior. The coefficient on joint auditor tenure, JTENURE, is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.03). This result shows that corporate 
behavior is greater in joint auditor tenure. SIZE is positively and significantly 
related to BASIK (p-value= <0.000). Larger firms are likely to follow better 
corporate behavior than smaller ones. Control variables, firm performance 
(ROA, p-value=0.019) and firm age (AGE, p-value= 0.027) inversely affect 
BASIK. This is different from the prior expectations. Companies with lower 
performance may show better corporate behavior to restore shareholders’ 
confidence, and companies in later stages of their business cycle may 
encounter complexity in business, which affects their corporate behavior. 
JCHANGE and LEVERAGE are positive and negative, respectively, but 
statistically insignificant. The insignificant result of JCHANGE could be 
attributed to the insignificant correlation between BASIK and it is two 
parameters (COMM and DISCLOSURE) as shown in Table 6. LEVERAGE 
carries an opposite sign and insignificant. This is due to the collinearity 
with SIZE, as Table 6 shows a strong correlation between these two 
variables (corr. = 0.53, p-value = < 0.000). Lastly, the coefficient on YEAR 
is statistically negative, indicating the impact of the 2008 global financial 
crisis on the KSE-listed firms’ behavior. 
Columns (b), (c) and (d) of Table 7 show the results of regression 
models 2, 3 and 4 (i.e., TRADING HISTORY, COMM and DISCLOSURE). 
BB is positive and statistically significant at p-values less or equal to 
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0.001. On the other hand, BS is insignificant across all three components 
of BASIK. JTENURE is significantly and positively associated with 
TRADING HISTORY, COMM and DISCLOSURE. Results for all other 
control variables, except for JCHANGE, are in-line with those reported 
under the BASIK model. 
Columns (e) through (h) of Table 7 show results of auditor tenure 
measured in a binary form along with other variables. LONG has a 
positive impact on BASIK (p-value = 0.03), TRADING HISTORY (p-value 
= 0.009), and COMM (p-value = 0.06). However, it has no impact on 
DISCLOSURE (p-value = 0.118). This is the evidence of improvement in 
the level of corporate behavior, especially in terms of trading history and 
communication, when joint auditor pair-client relationship exceeds five 
years. No indication of relationship, however, exists between BASIK and 
SHORT. This indicates that corporate behavior is not influenced by short 
auditor tenure. Results for all other independent variables (BB and BS) and 
control (JCHANGE, SIZE, LEVERAGE, ROA, AGE and YEAR) variables 
seem consistent with those reported in columns (a) through (d) of the same 
table.
In sum, results reported in Table 7 indicate that the choice of BB 
auditors positively affects the corporate behavior level, whilst the choice 
of other types of joint auditor pair has no effect on corporate behavior. That 
is, companies hiring two Big 4 auditors exhibit improvement in corporate 
behavior while companies hiring other types of joint auditor pair experience 
no improvement in corporate behavior. This result is consistent across all 
three parameters of BASIK. Clients of BB auditors are better in trading 
history, communication and disclosure transparency than clients of BS and 
SS. Therefore, the first null hypothesis (H1) is rejected. In other words, 
corporate behavior of companies audited by a BB auditor pair is different 
from that of companies audited by a BS auditor pair or by an SS auditor pair.
The results also suggest that the general behavior of public companies 
improves with joint auditor tenure, when measured in a continuous form. 
This improvement is also evident in all three practices of public companies 
(i.e. trading history and communication). Measuring joint auditor tenure in 
a dichotomous form, long auditor tenure leads to higher improvement in 
corporate behavior, and this improvement is evident in the client’s trading 
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history and communication practices. Therefore, evidence on joint auditor 
tenure rejects the null hypothesis H2. In other words, there is a relationship 
between joint auditor tenure and corporate behavior and this relationship 
tends to be positive. 
Lastly, the first year of joint auditor-client relationship has strong 
and positive impact on the client’s trading history practice. Clearly, when 
a company hires two new auditors, it possibly perceives its selection as a 
commitment to better evaluation of its trading patterns in terms of volatility, 
liquidity and shareholding structure.
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Robustness Tests 
The author checks the variance-inflation factors (VIF) for the 
independent variables in all Tobit models to make sure that the results are 
not influenced by multi-collinearity. The author finds (results no tabulated) 
that all VIF values are less than 10. Because Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim 
and Wasserman (1996) shows that multi-collinearity is not a concern for 
VIF values less than 10, the author does not expect the reported results to 
be driven by multi-collinearity. Next, the author re-runs all models after 
dropping out SIZE. Results (not tabulated) show LEVERAGE with a negative 
sign at p-values less than or equal to 0.001.
The author also examines the impact of the interaction of BB and 
JTENURE (BB_JTENURE), and BS and JTENURE (BS_JTENURE) 
on BASIK and three parameters: TRADING HISTORY, COMM and 
DISCLOSURE. The goal is to see whether the association between corporate 
behavior and joint auditor tenure will differ for BB and BS. Table 8 columns 
(a) through (d) document the effect of the interaction of joint auditor pair and 
joint tenure, measured in a continuous form, on corporate behavior. Evidence 
shows no impact of BB_JTENURE on BASIK and its three parameters.
However, the coefficient of BS_JTENURE carries a negative sign 
under the BASIK model, suggesting that corporate behavior is inversely 
influenced by the tenure of the BS auditor pair. As for the three categories 
of corporate behavior, only DISCLOSURE is negatively associated with 
BS_JTENURE. Similar results are reported when auditor tenure is measured 
in a dichotomous form (see Table 8 columns (e) through (g)). The level 
of disclosure transparency declines when clients have a long business 
relationship with a BS auditor pair. 
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, the impact of joint auditor pair and joint auditor tenure on 
corporate behavior is examined using a sample of companies listed on 
Kuwait stock exchange (KSE) during the years of 2008 to 2009. The 
importance of corporate behavior stems from its perceived effect on firm 
value (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Black, Jang & Kim, 2006). This is obvious 
in countries where regulations and cultural constraints are insufficient to 
govern corporate behavior (Black, 2001). Corporate behavior is measured 
based on a proxy developed by TNI and Hawkamah. This proxy, BASIK, is 
composed of three groups (trading history, communication and disclosure), 
where each group is based on unequal weighted parameters.
Results indicate that the choice of BB auditor pair positively affects the 
level of corporate behavior. Clients of the Big 4-Big 4 auditor pair exhibit 
an increase in trading history, communication and disclosure transparency. 
The interactions between the Big 4 auditors are possibly highly coordinated, 
more technological efficient and increase incentives to produce an adequate 
effort for Big 4 pairs. This explanation, however, seems unlikely with other 
auditor pairs. The choice of other auditor pairs, however, shows no effect 
on corporate behavior. 
The results also indicate that joint auditor tenure, measured in a 
continuous form, has a positive and significant association with the level 
of corporate behavior. Measured in a dichotomous form, longer tenure is 
positively related to the level of corporate behavior, and this association is 
evident in the company’s trading history and communication. In other words, 
joint auditor tenure has a positive effect on a company’s communication 
and disclosure after the fifth year of the two auditors’ engagement. Short 
client-auditor relationship (i.e. two to three years), however, has no effect 
on corporate behavior level. In general, therefore, a longer joint auditor-
client relation improves the level of corporate behavior.
Nonetheless, results show that auditor tenure of the choice of two Big 
4 auditors has no effect on the level of corporate behavior. This evidence is 
consistent when auditor tenure is measured in continuous and dichotomous 
forms. On the other hand, auditor tenure of the choice of other auditor 
pairs (i.e. BS/SS), tends to have a negative effect on the DISCLOSURE 
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parameter only. Once again, this result is consistent using continuous and 
dichotomous forms of auditor tenure. Lastly, the first year of joint auditor-
client relationship has strong and positive impact on the client’s trading 
history. When a company hires two new auditors, it possibly perceives its 
choice as a commitment to better evaluation of its trading patterns in terms 
of volatility, liquidity and shareholding structure. 
The results of this paper should be useful to investors, corporations, 
regulators, and academics. Investors should be aware that the choice of 
joint auditor pair provides useful insights to the behavior of public firms, 
in terms of trading patterns, communication and disclosure transparency. 
Corporations could benefit from the choice of auditor pair in identifying 
the areas and activities for improvement and restructuring. In addition, 
stronger behavior could unlock the access to other GCC and international 
capital markets. Regulators should understand that investors take both the 
choices of auditor pair and auditor tenure into account when evaluating 
corporate behavior. Future researches investigating the area of corporate 
behavior where joint audit is regulated should be cognizant of the impact 
of the choice of auditor pair and joint auditor tenure on corporate behavior.
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